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Abstract
I discuss several lessons regarding the design and conduct of mon-
etary policy that have emerged out of the New Keynesian research
program. Those lessons include the bene￿ts of price stability, the
gains from commitment about future policies, the importance of nat-
ural variables as benchmarks for policy, and the bene￿ts of a credible
anti-in￿ ationary stance. I also point to one challenge facing NK mod-
elling e⁄orts: the need to come up with relevant sources of policy
tradeo⁄s. A potentially useful approach to meeting that challenge,
based on the introduction of real imperfections, is presented.
JEL Classi￿cation: E52
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￿Paper presented at the Center for Financial Studies Symposium on "The Science and
Practice of Monetary Policy Today," Frankfurt, October 4, 2007. Much of the research
described in this paper is based on joint work with Olivier Blanchard, Rich Clarida, and
Mark Gertler, whom should get credit for all the valuable insights. I remain solely respon-
sible for any misrepresentation of that work.The New Keynesian Framework: Key Elements
The New Keynesian (NK) approach to monetary policy analysis has
emerged in recent years as one of the most in￿ uential and proli￿c areas
of research in macroeconomics.1 It has provided us with a framework that
combines the theoretical rigor of Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory with
Keynesian ingredients like monopolistic competition and nominal ridigities.
That framework has also become the basis for the new generation of models
being developed at central banks, and increasingly used for simulation and
forecasting purposes.2 In the present paper I will try to summarize what I
view as some of the key lessons that have emerged from that research pro-
gram and to point to some of the challenges it faces, as well as possible ways
of overcoming those challenges.
Among the key de￿ning features of the NK approach to monetary policy
analysis the following seem worth emphasizing:
￿ It adopts many of the tools originally associated with RCB theory,
including the systematic use of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models based on optimizing behavior by households and ￿rms,
rational expectations, market clearing, etc.
￿ Firms are modelled as monopolistic competitors, i.e. each ￿rm faces a
well-de￿ned demand schedule for the good it produces, and sets the
price of that good (as opposed to taking it as given) in order to maxi-
mize its discounted pro￿ts.
￿ Nominal rigidities are a key element of the model and a main source of
monetary policy non-neutrality. They are generally introduced in the
form of constraints on the frequency with which ￿rms and/or workers
can adjust their nominal prices and wages, respectively. An implication
of such constraints is that price and wage-setting decisions become
forward-looking, since agents recognize that the prices/wages they set
will remain e⁄ective beyond the current period.
￿ Emphasis is given to the endogenous component of monetary policy
(i.e. monetary policy rules) and the consequences of alternative spec-
1See Gal￿ and Gertler (2007) for a quick introduction to the NK framework. The
textbooks by Woodford (2003b) and Gal￿ (2008) provide a more comprehensive treatment
and analysis of the NK model.
2See, e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007).
1i￿cations of that component, rather than to the e⁄ects of exogenous
changes in a monetary policy instrument.
￿ The NK framework can be used in order to evaluate the desirability
of alternative policy rules, as well as to determine the optimal such
rule, using a welfare-based criterion, based on the maximization of the
utility of the economy￿ s representative consumer, and in a way largely
immune to the Lucas critique.
In addition to the previous elements, which are inherent to the basic
NK model, one should emphasize that an important characteristic of the NK
framework more generally lies in its proven ￿ exibility to accommodate a large
number of extensions of that basic model, including those incorporating open
economy features, imperfect information and learning, unemployment, credit
frictions, etc.
But what are are the main insights that have emerged from the NK
research program and what are some of the challenges it faces? This is the
subject to which the present paper is devoted. The lessons and novel insights
I will focus on below pertain to the following topics:
￿ The costs of in￿ ation and the bene￿ts of price stability
￿ The role of expectations and the gains from commitment
￿ Importance of "natural" levels of output and interest rates as policy
benchmarks
￿ The bene￿ts of a credible anti-in￿ ationary policy
Before turning to a discussion of the above themes, I ￿nd it convenient to
write down the three equations that constitute the simplest possible version
of the NK model and which I will use in subsequent sections to illustrate the
main points I want to convey.
The ￿rst equation, usually referred to as the New Keynesian Phillips curve
(NKPC), can be derived from the aggregation of the price-setting decisions
by ￿rms, combined with an equation describing the relationship between
marginal cost and the level of activity. It takes the form
￿t = ￿ Etf￿t+1g + ￿ xt + ut (1)
2where ￿t is in￿ ation, xt is the output gap, and ut is a cost-push shock, ut.The
output gap, xt ￿ yt ￿yn
t , is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between (log) output yt
and the (log) natural level of output,yn
t , where the latter corresponds to the
level of output that would prevail in equilibrium in the absence of nominal
frictions.
The second key block of the model relates the output gap positively to
its expected one-period ahead value, and negatively to the interest rate gap,
where the latter is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the real interest rate
it ￿ Etf￿t+1g and the natural rate of interest rn
t , where the latter is de￿ned
as the equilibrium real interest rate in the absence of nominal rigidities. The




(it ￿ Etf￿t+1g ￿ r
n
t ) + Etfxt+1g (2)
Finally, the model can be closed by means of a block describing how
monetary policy is conducted. The simplest possible such description is given
by a version of the so-called Taylor rule, which takes the form:
it = ￿ + ￿￿ ￿t + ￿y b yt + vt
where it is the short-term nominal rate, and b yt represents deviations of (log)
output from steady state (or trend level).
1 The Costs of In￿ ation and the Bene￿ts of
Price Stability
What are the reasons why central banks should pursue a policy aimed at
price stability? The NK framework provides a rigorous justi￿cation for those
policies. To understand the main argument let us assume at this point that
there are no cost-push shocks, i.e. ut = 0 for all t and that the presence of
nominal rigidities is the only source of potential ine¢ ciency in the level of
output. In that case, and as captured by the NKPC (1), in￿ ation will become
an indicator of an ine¢ cient level of activity, emerging from a deviation of
output from its natural level caused by the presence of nominal rigidities.
Thus, even if the central bank were not to care about in￿ ation in itself, it
will ￿nd its stabilization desirable as an indirect way to close the output gap.
Furthermore, this will be possible even if the natural level of output (and
thus the output gap) is unobservable.
3But in addition to its role as a signal of an ine¢ cient level of activity,
the NK framework points to a more direct cost of in￿ ation: it generates an
ine¢ cient allocation of resources across ￿rms/sectors. To understand this
channel, note that if there is positive in￿ ation some ￿rms must be raising
their prices each period. But since not all ￿rms can adjust their prices (or
￿nd it privately too costly to do so), relative prices will vary in ways not
justi￿ed by sectoral or ￿rm-level shocks, leading to suboptimal quantities of
di⁄erent goods being produced and consumed.
Note that a literal interpretation of the previous argument would call for
zero in￿ ation to be sought at all times, independently of the costs in terms
of employment or economic activity. But in practice several factors may call
for maintaining a positive average level of in￿ ation. Those include the risk
of hitting a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate if the average level
of the latter (which is related to average in￿ ation) were too low. Also, the
presence of downward nominal wage rigidities which may prevent warranted
reductions in real wages in the absence of positive in￿ ation. Furthermore,
and independently of the desired level for average in￿ ation, the presence of
cost-push shocks generates a short-run tradeo⁄ between stabilization of in-
￿ ation and stabilization of the output gap. To the extent that variations
in both variables are independent sources of welfare losses (and under stan-
dard assumptions on the latter), it will be optimal for the central bank to
accommodate some of the in￿ ationary pressures.
Both considerations, taken together, suggest as a desirable policy the
attainment of a positive target for in￿ ation, over a medium-term horizon.
That prescription appears to be consistent with the strategy followed by
many central banks around the world.
2 The Role of Expectations and the Gains
from Commitment
The forward-looking nature of price setting and consumption decisions imply
that both in￿ ation and the output gap depend not only on the current value
of their driving variables but also on their anticipated future values. In other
words, both in￿ ation and the output gap are forward-looking variables. As a
result, anticipated policy actions will have an in￿ uence on current outcomes,
and thus the central bank may bene￿t from being able to in￿ uence those
4expectations. To illustrate this point it is convenient to rewrite equations (1)
and (2) as follows:
























Suppose that an in￿ ationary cost-push shock (i.e. a positive realization of
ut) hits the economy. In the absence of a commitment technology, the central
bank can lower the current output gap in order to mitigate the impact of the
shock on in￿ ation. On the other hand, if the central bank can credibly
commit to future state contingent actions it can achieve the same in￿ ation
outcome with a smaller output gap decline, by promising lower future output
gaps and thus driving down the expectational term in equation (3). To the
extent that welfare losses are convex in the output gap, such a smoothing of
the necessary output adjustment would be a more desirable strategy. Note,
however that such a policy will be time inconsistent: once the shock has
vanished the central bank will be tempted to renege on its promises and
stimulate the economy, bringing the output gap back to zero.3
A similar argument applies to the central bank￿ s attempts to attain a
given level of the output gap through changes in the interest rate: as (4)
makes clear it can do so by adjusting the current rate by a large amount
or, alternatively, by smoothing the change over several periods, as long as it
succeeds in convincing consumers (and ￿rms, in a model with investment)
that it will e⁄ectively do so. To the extent that ￿ uctuations in interest rates
generate welfare losses that are convex in the size of those ￿ uctuations the
second strategy would generally be more desirable.4
More generally, the analysis of monetary policy in the context of a model
with forward-looking variables points to the importance of credible commit-
ment as a way to improve the central bank￿ s current trade-o⁄s. Commu-
nication with the public about the central bank￿ s intentions takes a central
role in that context. The current practice of central banks like the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, the Norges Bank, and the Riksbank of publishing the
3See, e.g. Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) for an analysis of the optimal policy under
commitment in the presence of cost-push shocks.
4See, e.g. Woodford (2003a).
5future interest rate path that is anticipated by the banks￿decision-makers
themselves, given their current information, can be seen as an excellent illus-
tration of expectations management at work.
3 The Importance of Natural Levels as Policy
Benchmarks
The natural levels of output and the interest rate play an important role
in the design of monetary policy in the NK framework. Unfortunately, the
inherent unobservability of those variables complicate their use in practice.
Furthermore, their replacement by variables that may be viewed as proxies
may do more harm than good.
A clear illustration of that problem can be found in the use of measures
for the output gap. In numerous applications that variable is approximated
by detrending (log) GDP using some statistical procedure, which generally
associates the trend with a smooth function of time. By contrast, the bench-
mark used in the NK framework in order to determine the output gap is
the natural level of output, which may display signi￿cant short run ￿ uctua-
tions in response to all kinds of real shocks and, hence, is likely to be poorly
approximated by a smooth function of time.5
In order to illustrate some of the potential consequences of using de-
trended output as a proxy for the output gap in implementation of policy









subject to (1). Let me restrict, for the sake of simplicity, to the case of
no commitment, thus implying that the central bank takes expectations as
given, e⁄ectively solving a sequence of static problems.6 I also assume that
futg and fyn
t g follow independent exogenous white noise processes.7
5See Gal￿ and Gertler (1998) for a discussion of the implications of using detrended
GDP in empirical evaluations of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
6See Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (1999) for a more detailed analysis of that problem.
7The generalization to AR(1) processes is straightforward and leads no additional in-
sights.





for all t. Substituting that optimality condition into (1) and solving for
in￿ ation we obtain
￿t =
￿
￿ + ￿2 ut
which combined with (5) yields
xt = ￿
￿
￿ + ￿2 ut




￿ + ￿2 ￿(ut)
￿(xt) =
￿
￿ + ￿2 ￿(ut)
Suppose next that, given the unobservability of output gap xt the central
bank replaces it with detrended GDP when trying to implement optimality
condition (5). Thus we have








￿t ￿ b y
n
t (6)
Combining (6) with (1) we can solve for the implied equilibrium levels of
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Thus, we see that the focus on detrended output instead of the output gap
leads to higher volatility in both in￿ ation and the output gap, and hence, to
greater welfare losses. Note that the additional welfare losses are proportional
to ￿(b yn
t ), which measures the variability of the natural level of output. The
intuition for this result comes from the fact that, under (5), the central bank
fully accomodates all the variations in the natural level of output, keeping
in￿ ation and the output gap unchanged; by contrast, the adoption of (6)
as a rule has the consequence (albeit unintentional) of smoothing output
variations excessively, even when the latter are backed by changes in the
natural level of output. Note ￿nally that the excess volatility created by
the implementation of the "approximate" rule is increasing in the weight
attached to output gap variability in the loss function.
The previous example illustrates the potential usefulness of measures of
the natural level of output in the implementation of monetary policy. A
similar case can be made for the natural interest rate: one can show that,
under the model assumptions made above, the optimal discretionary policy
can be implemented by means an interest rate rule of the form
it = r
n
t + ￿￿ ￿t
with ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ .8 Note that the previous rule requires that the central bank
adjust the nominal rate one-for-one in response to variations in the natural
rate. That policy is hampered in practice by the unobservability of the latter.
The importance of natural levels of output and the interest rate makes
the development of estimated DSGE models particularly useful, since those
models can be used to make inferences (however imprecise) on those variables.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the behavior of the output gap measures that have
been backed out from some of the existing estimated DSGE models have little
resemblance from the ones obtained using traditional detrending approaches
or an earlier generation of models.9
8The desired allocation will be the unique equilibrium if ￿ < ￿￿, i.e. if the interest
rate rule satis￿es the so called Taylor principle.
9See, e.g. Edge, Kiley and Laforte (2007).
84 The Bene￿ts of a Credible Anti-In￿ ationary
Policy
Next I illustrate the bene￿ts of credibility when pursuing a strong anti-
in￿ ationary policy. Suppose that the economy is, once again, described by
equations (1) and (2).10 The central bank follows a simple interest rate rule
of the form
it = ￿ + ￿￿ ￿t (7)
where ￿￿ > 1. The public, however, believes the rule is given by
it = ￿ + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿t + vt (8)
where ￿ is a constant that can be interpreted as a "credibility gap," measuring
the extent to which the public "discounts" the central bank￿ s anti-in￿ ation
stance. The error term vt is taken to be an exogenous policy shock, following
a white noise process. Finally, it is assumed that ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) > 1.
I solve for the equilibrium of the model by combining (1), (2), and (8), for
an arbitrary white noise process fvtg and under the assumption that the cost-
push shock futg follows an AR(1) process with autoregressive coe¢ cient ￿u.
For simplicity I assume a constant natural interest rate rn
t = ￿. The resulting
equilibrium, which can be easily solved for using the method of undetermined
coe¢ cients, is given by:
￿t = a ut + b vt
xt = c ut + d vt
where a ￿
￿(1￿￿u)
￿(1￿￿u)(1￿￿￿u)+￿[￿￿(1￿￿)￿￿u], b ￿ ￿ ￿
￿+￿￿￿(1￿￿), c ￿ ￿
￿￿(1￿￿)￿￿u
￿(1￿￿u)(1￿￿￿u)+￿[￿￿(1￿￿)￿￿u],
and d ￿ ￿ 1
￿+￿￿￿(1￿￿).
Given that the central bank truly follows (7) it must be the case that, ex-
post, vt = ￿￿￿ ￿t for all t, which we can impose on the equilibrium conditions
above to obtain ￿nal expressions for in￿ ation and the output gap as functions












10The exercise presented here is based on Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007b).
9In oder to determine the impact of the credibility gap on the tradeo⁄
facing the central bank I compute the standard deviations of in￿ ation and
the output gap, ￿(￿t) and ￿(xt), implied by the previous expressions for a
calibrated version of the model. In particular I assume ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = 0:1,
￿ = 1, ￿(ut) = 0:25 and ￿u = 0:9, all of which are kept unchanged. I then
consider two values for the credibility gap: ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0, with the latter
corresponding to the full credibility benchmark. Figure 1 shows, for each
value of ￿ considered, the locus of feasible combinations of ￿(￿t) and ￿(xt)
given the interest rate rule (7), with that locus being spanned by varying ￿￿
over its admissible range.11
As Figure 1 makes clear, an improvement in credibility (captured here by
a decline in ￿ from 0:5 to 0) makes it possible, through an appropriate choice
of ￿￿ to reduce simultaneously the volatility of both in￿ ation and the output
gap. In other words, there are potential welfare gains to be made if the central
bank conveys in a credible way the degree of its anti-in￿ ationary stance. By
appearing more dovish than the central bank actually is the tradeo⁄ it faces
between stabilization of in￿ ation and stabilization of the output gap is likely
to worsen.
5 Sources of Policy Tradeo⁄s in the New Key-
nesian Framework: A Challenge?
Despite the overall success of the NK research program and the favorable
assessment of the ability of medium-scale versions of the NK model.several
challenges remain. Here I brie￿ y discuss one such challenge, which was the
focus of.Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007a): the need to uncover relevant sources of
policy tradeo⁄s.
While the analysis above has made use of a version of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (given by (1)) that incorporates a tradeo⁄ between output
gap and in￿ ation stabilization in the form of an exogenous cost-push shock
ut, what the latter represents is often far from clear. In fact, the in￿ ation
equations that emerges in the baseline NK model lacks that feature and takes
instead the form
￿t = ￿ Etf￿t+1g + ￿ (yt ￿ y
n
t ) (9)
11The standard deviation of in￿ ation is multiplied by 4 so that it corresponds to a
measure of in￿ ation expressed in annual rates.
10Note that, under (9), in￿ ation occurs if and only if the level of output is
above its corresponding level with ￿ exible prices. The reason is that only in
that case (and under standard assumptions) average markups will be lower
than desired and, as a result, ￿rms that adjust their prices will tend increase
the latter, generating in￿ ation.
Furthermore, in standard versions of the NK framework, the underlying
real model implies a constant gap between the natural (i.e. ￿ exible price)
output yn
t and the e¢ cient output, ye
t. That gap is a consequence of the
presence of monopolistic competition (with constant desired markups) in
goods markets which, if uncorrected, makes output ine¢ ciently low even in






Combining both equations, we obtain
￿t = ￿ Etf￿t+1g + ￿ (yt ￿ y
e
t + ￿) (10)
which makes clear the absence of a trade-o⁄ between stabilization of in￿ a-
tion and stabilization of the welfare-relevant output gap, where the latter
is de￿ned as the (log) deviation between output and the e¢ cient level of
output.
The lack of such a tradeo⁄, a property which Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007a)
refer to as "the divine coincidence," implies that central banks should focus
on completely stabilizing in￿ ation, period by period, and with no concern for
the output or employment losses that such a policy might bring about. The
reason is that, according to the above framework, the resulting ￿ uctuations
in those variables would re￿ ect, one-for-one, movements in their e¢ cient
levels. That implication is clearly at odds with conventional wisdom as well
as with the practice of most central banks, including those that claim to
follow an in￿ ation targeting strategy. In practice, attainability of the in￿ ation
objective is understood to refer to the medium run, or in expectation over a
certain horizon, but not necessarily "continuously," as the model without a
tradeo⁄ would imply.
A number of solutions to the above problem have been proposed in the
literature. The simplest one, adopted in earlier sections of the present paper,
consists in appending an exogenous disturbance to in￿ ation equation (10).
That disturbance can be interpreted as resulting from exogenous variations
in distortionary taxes, and/or exogenous changes in desired wage and price
11markups.12 Such factors would lead to exogenous variations in the gap be-
tween the e¢ cient and natural levels of output and, hence, to an in￿ ation
equation of the form
￿t = ￿ Etf￿t+1g + ￿ (yt ￿ y
e
t) + ￿￿t
with the consequent policy tradeo⁄s. Yet, that solution seems unsatisfactory,
since it restricts the existence of meaningful policy tradeo⁄s to shocks that
are unlikely to be major drivers of macro ￿ uctuations.
The introduction of staggered nominal wage setting, as in Erceg, Hen-
derson, and Levin (2000), while leaving unaltered the property of a constant
gap between ye
t and yn
t , generates a tradeo⁄ between price in￿ ation and the
welfare relevant output gap, as a consequence of the endogenous variations
in wage markups resulting from the sluggish adjustment of nominal wages.
Yet, that tradeo⁄is somewhat apparent since it is possible to derive an equa-
tion for a particular weighted average of price and wage in￿ ation,￿t, which
takes the same form as (10), with ￿t replacing ￿t. Most importantly, and as
discussed in Erceg et al. (2000) and Woodford (2003b), complete stabiliza-
tion of the welfare relevant output gap (and, hence, of that speci￿c weighted
average of price and wage in￿ ation) is nearly optimal in that model. Thus,
once again, the central bank should focus exclusively on fully stabilizing an
in￿ ation measure, period by period, without concern for the output and em-
ployment consequences of such a policy. In that sense, the model lacks a
meaningful policy tradeo⁄.
5.1 An Alternative Approach: Real Imperfections as
a Source of Policy Tradeo⁄s
In a recent paper with Olivier Blanchard, we have proposed an alternative
source of monetary policy tradeo⁄s, resulting from he existence of real imper-
fections. The latter may lead to ine¢ cient responses to shocks, even in the
absence of nominal rigidities.13 In other words, and using the terminology
introduced above, the natural level of output and the e¢ cient level of output
may not adjust by the same amount in response to di⁄erent real shocks. As
a result the gap ye
t ￿ yn
t will vary endogenously with the implied in￿ ation
12See, e.g. Steinsson (2003).
13See Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007)
12equation being









In this context, it is clear that an endogenous tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation
and output gap stabilization will emerge, with strict in￿ ation targeting being
no longer optimal.
What are examples of real imperfections that are likely to generate such
tradeo⁄s? In a series of recent papers with Olivier Blanchard we have focused
on slow adjustment of real wages as such an imperfection.14 In particular,
if the real wage responds less than one-for-one to changes in the marginal
rate of substitution when a supply shock (e.g. an increase in the price of
oil) hits the economy the natural level of output will display excessive ￿ uc-
tuations relative to the e¢ cient level of output. Fully stabilizing in￿ ation
would require closing the gap between output and its natural level, which
would thus generate welfare-reducing ￿ uctuations in the gap between output
and its e¢ cient counterpart. A strict in￿ ation targeting policy will generally
not be optimal in this context. Instead, the optimal policy will generally
involve a partial accommodation of in￿ ationary pressures in the short run,
with in￿ ation returning to its long term target level only gradually.
One can imagine other real imperfections that would have analogous im-
plications. Consider, for instance, a model with credit market imperfections
along the lines of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), in which there is an
external ￿nance premium (i.e. the wedge between the interest rate charged
to ￿rms to ￿nance their investment projects and the consumer·s marginal
rate of intertemporal substitution) which is decreasing in net worth. The
resulting model generates a ￿nancial accelerator mechanism: in the absence
of nominal rigidities, adverse shocks will lead to a reduction in net worth
and, consequently, an increase in the external ￿nance premium and an ine¢ -
ciently large reduction in investment and output. In the presence of nominal
rigidities there is room for monetary policy to a⁄ect the level of economic
activity and thus to alleviate such excessive ￿ uctuations. Doing so, however,
would require deviating from a strict in￿ ation targeting policy, since the lat-
ter will generally bring about the ￿ exible price equilibrium allocation. Early
explorations of the consequences of credit market frictions on the design of
14See Blanchard and Gal￿ (2006, 2007a, 2007b).
13monetary policy can be found in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2006),
Faia and Monacelli (2006), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), and Monacelli (2006).
6 Concluding remarks
In the present paper I have discussed some of the lessons for monetary policy
that have emerged from the New Keynesian research program. Those lessons
include, but are not restricted to, the bene￿ts of price stability, the gains
from commitment about future policies, the importance of natural variables
as benchmarks for policy, and the bene￿ts of a credible anti-in￿ ationary
stance. I have also pointed to one challenge facing NK modelling e⁄orts￿ the
need to come up with relevant sources of meaningful policy tradeo⁄s￿ and
brie￿ y discussed a potentially fruitful approach to meeting that challenge,
based on the introduction of real imperfections which create an endogenous
time-varying wedge between the e¢ cient and natural levels of output.
In spite of some of the challenges and shortcoming of the NK approach, I
believe the overall verdict is a positive one. It has generated many novel
insights that appear to be relevant for the design and practical conduct
of monetary policy. It also provides a coherent framework to organize our
thinking about the workings of the economy and to provide internally con-
sistent accounts of actual macroeconomic developments. Furthermore, the
NK framework has proved to be a very ￿ exible tool, capable of accommodat-
ing a large number of features missing from the basic model, including open
economy factors, imperfect information and learning, unemployment, credit
frictions, etc. Finally, the ongoing adoption of the NK framework as the core
of the medium-scale models under development at central banks and other
institutions guarantees that at least some of the quantitative analysis under-
taken at those institutions, whether aimed at policy simulation or forecasts,
is backed by rigorous theoretical macro modelling. Time will tell whether
central banks end up ￿nding that quantitative analysis useful, but I think
there are reasons to be optimistic as long as the expectations are not set too
high. After all, even in its rich incarnations full of bells and whistles, the NK
model is still a highly sylized representation of the economy, so one must be
aware of its limitations. But it is certainly an improvement over purely sta-
tistical models or the old-fashioned, largely atheoretical macroeconometric
models of the not so distant past..
14References
Bayoumi, Tam (2004): ￿GEM: A New International Macroeconomic Model,￿
IMF Occasional Paper no. 239.
Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist (1999), "The Financial
Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework," in J. Taylor and
M. Woodford (eds.) Handbook of Macroeconomics, , volume 1C, 1341-1397,
Elsevier, New York.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Jordi Gal￿ (2006): "A New Keynesian Model
with Unemployment," mimeo.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Jordi Gal￿ (2007a): ￿Real Wage Rigidities and
the New Keynesian Model,￿Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, supple-
ment to volume 39, no. 1, 35-66.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Jordi Gal￿ (2007b): "The Macroeconomic Ef-
fects of Oil Shocks: Why are the 2000s so Di⁄erent from the 1970s?," NBER
WP#13668.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Roberto Motto and Massimo Rostagno (2006):
"Monetary Policy and Stock Market Boom-Bust Cycles," mimeo.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gal￿, and Mark Gertler (1999): ￿The Science
of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective,￿Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 37, 1661-1707.
Edge, Rochelle M., Michael T. Kiley and Jean-Philippe Laforte (2007):
"Documentation of the Research and Statistics Division￿ s Estimated DSGE
Model of the U.S. Economy: 2006 Version," Finance and Economics Discus-
sion Series 2007-53, Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C.
Erceg, Christopher J., Dale W. Henderson, and Andrew T. Levin (2000):
￿Optimal Monetary Policy with Staggered Wage and Price Contracts,￿Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics vol. 46, no. 2, 281-314.
Faia, Ester and Tommaso Monacelli (2006): "Optimal Interest Rate
Rules, Asset Prices and Credit Frictions," Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, vol. 31, no. 10, 3228-3254.
Gal￿, Jordi (2008): Monetary Policy, In￿ation, and the Business Cycle.
An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework and its Monetary Policy
Applications, Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
Gal￿, Jordi and Mark Gertler (1999): ￿In￿ ation Dynamics: A Structural
Econometric Analysis,￿ Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 44, no. 2,
195-222.
15Gal￿, Jordi and Mark Gertler (2007): "Macroeconomic Modeling for Mon-
etary Policy Evaluation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 21, no. 4,
25-45.
Gilchrist, Simon and John Leahy (2002): "Monetary Policy and Asset
Prices," Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (1), 75-97.
Monacelli, Tommaso (2006): "Optimal Monetary Policy with Collateral-
ized Household Debt and Borrowing Constraints," mimeo.
Nakamura, Emi and Jon Steinsson (2006): "Five Facts about Prices: A
Reevaluation of Menu Costs Models," Harvard University, mimeo.
Smets, Frank, and Raf Wouters (2003): ￿An Estimated Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area,￿Journal of the European
Economic Association, vol 1, no. 5, 1123-1175.
Smets, Frank, and Raf Wouters (2007): "Shocks and Frictions in US
Business Cycles: a Bayesian DSGE Approach," American Economic Review,
vol. 97 (3), 586-606.
Steinsson, J￿n (2003): ￿Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy with
In￿ ation Persistence,￿Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 50, no. 7., 1425-
1456.
Woodford, Michael (2001): ￿The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary
Policy,￿American Economic Review vol. 91, no. 2, 232-237.
Woodford, Michael (2003a): ￿Optimal Interest Rate Smoothing,￿Review
of Economic Studies, vol. 70, no. 4, 861-886.
Woodford, Michael (2003b): Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory
of Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press.(Princeton, New Jersey).
16Figure 1. Policy Credibility and Macroeconomic Volatility
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